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1 Introduction
Numerous studies analyze the reactions of markets and market participants to the releases
of public information, such as earnings announcements.1 However, little is known about
how market participants react in a crisis situation with a high degree of uncertainty in
connection with a large drop of share prices.
Our study offers the unique opportunity to analyze how an unprecedented crisis such as
the September 11 tragedy influences expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual
investors. Knowing which factors influence these forecasts is important as asset prices and
portfolio allocations are driven by expectations of investors. Markowitz (1952) describes
portfolio selection as a two step procedure. In the first step, investors have to form beliefs
about the future performance of securities. The second step starts with these beliefs and
ends with a portfolio choice. Sharpe (1964) assumes that investors think of returns of an
investment in terms of a probability distribution and that they base their choices only
on two parameters of this distribution: the expected value and the standard deviation.2
These models show that expected return and the variance of assets are crucial for deter-
mining portfolio allocations or asset prices. But they are silent about the process of belief
formation.
We asked a randomly selected group of individual investors with accounts at a German
online broker to answer a questionnaire that we put on the internet. Among other questions
1See, for example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Fama (1998) for a list of event studies. Kandel
and Pearson (1995) analyze forecast revisions of stock brokerage research analysts and document differential interpretation
of earnings announcements.
2Sharpe (1964), p. 428.
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(belonging to another project, see Glaser and Weber (2003)), investors were asked to give
a median estimate and upper and lower bounds of a symmetric 90 % confidence interval of
the value of two German indexes and of the price of two German stocks at the end of the
year 2001 (Deutscher Aktienindex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index, BASF, Deutsche
Telekom). Investors received an e-mail with the link to the questionnaire on Thursday,
August 2, 2001. A second e-mail to the remaining investors who have not yet answered,
scheduled five weeks later, was postponed due to the terror attacks of September 11 until
Thursday, September 20, 2001. We refer to the group of investors who answered directly
after the first e-mail as “first group” and to the group of investors who answered after
the second e-mail as the “second group”. The second group of investors answered exactly
on the day with the lowest value of the German blue chip index DAX in the year 2001.
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the charts of the four time series in the year 2001. The first
vertical line in the respective chart indicates the date of response of the first group, the
second vertical line shows the date of response of the second group.3
This paper offers the opportunity to study how a crisis situation that is accompanied by a
large drop in share prices over a short time period of only several days affects estimates of
expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. In addition to forecasts of
expected returns and volatilities we are able to analyze the level of disagreement among
investors (“differences of opinion”4).
We do not answer the question what a rational prediction of stock prices or a rational
3The respondents to the first questionnaire had a forecast horizon of 21 weeks, respondents to the second questionnaire
had a 14 week horizon.
4See Glaser and Weber (2003) for details on the “differences of opinion” literature.
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reaction to the September 11 crisis should have looked like. The voluminous literature
about rational expectations and econometric issues regarding predictions of time series
and forecast evaluation tries to answer this question.5 We study how the expectations
of individual investors change in a crisis situation or after an event such as the terror
attacks of September 11. We try to evaluate the plausibility of the answers of investors for
example by comparing volatility estimates to historical volatilities as a crude benchmark.
Unfortunately, we are not able to analyze whether the respondents of the second group
actually traded stocks at the time of response. Due to an organizational restructuring, it
was impossible to obtain transaction data from the online broker apart from the data set
mentioned in Section 2.
This paper belongs to the strand of literature that examines the effects of the terror
attacks of September 11 on financial markets and the economy as a whole. Graham and
Harvey (2001, 2002) analyze, in a study close to ours, expectations of risk premia, as well
as their volatility and asymmetry in a panel survey. On a quarterly basis, Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs) of U.S. corporations are asked to provide their estimates of the market risk
premium. One of these quarterly surveys was distributed on September 10, 2001. Some of
the responses were received on September 10, 2001 via fax, others after the September 11
crisis. Graham and Harvey (2001, 2002) find that the estimate of the one year risk premium
decreases sharply after September 11 whereas volatility forecasts increase. Poteshman
(2003) analyzes whether there was unusual option market activity prior to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Anderson and Wagener (2002) analyze the impact of the
September 11 crisis on expectations of future Euribor interest rates. Carter and Simkins
5See, for example, Diebold and Lopez (1996).
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(2002) investigate the reaction of airline stock prices to the terrorist attacks. Straetmans,
Verschoor, and Wolff (2003) answer the questions whether U.S. common stocks exhibit
a higher propensity towards sharp declines and whether sharp drops in stock prices tend
to co-move more frequently since Septmember 11. They do not find much support for
a structural change in downside risk as measured, for example, by the Value-at-Risk. A
special issue of the Economic Policy Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(volume 8, number 2) analyzes economic consequences of September 11. Several authors
discuss issues like economic costs (costs as direct consequences of the attacks as well
as costs arising from efforts to prevent future attacks), the attacks’ disruptive effects
on the payments and securities settlement systems, and New York City’s prospects after
September 11. A special issue of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Volume 26, Numbers
2/3) deals with the risks of terrorism with a special focus on September 11.
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows. Return forecasts of the
investors in our sample are significantly higher after September 11. The actual returns from
the respective time of response until the end of the year 2001 are overestimated in both
groups. The second group of investors states return forecasts that are approximately twice
as high as the true realized returns. After the terror attacks, volatility forecasts are higher
than before September 11. In two out of four cases, historical volatilities are overestimated.
Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in the way that they underestimate
the variance of stock returns. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are
lower after the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts
are mainly unaffected. Furthermore, differences of opinion are generally higher with regard
to return (point) forecasts when compared to differences of opinion with regard volatility
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forecasts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology
of the study. Section 3 presents the results and the last section concludes.
2 Methodology
This study is based on an internet questionnaire that was part of a larger project (see
Glaser and Weber (2003) for details). Approximately 3,000 randomly selected individual
investors of a German online broker received an e-mail on Thursday, August 2, 2001 with a
link to the online questionnaire. 129 investors answered around the following week-end. We
call this group the “first group”. The remaining group of investors received a second e-mail
on Thursday, September 20, 2001. 86 investors answered around the following weekend.
The group is called the “second group”. Thus, we have a response rate of about 7 %,
which is comparable to the response rates of similar questionnaires.6 In what follows, we
compare return and volatility forecasts of two separate groups of investors. The differences
of findings in the two groups could, of course, be due to another reason besides September
11: The two groups of individual investors might be different not only in their estimate of,
say, expected returns but also in various other dimensions which would make it difficult to
argue that we have estimates of a homogenous group of investors in both groups. However,
we are able to compare the two groups along various dimensions such as trading activity,
portfolio positions, investment strategy, or demographic information.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of various characteristics (age, stock market invest-
6See, for example, Graham and Harvey (2002).
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ment experience in years, information in hours per week, number of transactions in all
security categories, number of stock transactions, mean monthly stock portfolio turnover,
stock portfolio value in EUR, income in EUR of the two groups of respondents as well
as the p-value of a Mann-Whitney test (Null hypothesis is that the two populations are
from the same distribution). Furthermore, Table 1 presents the percentage of men and
women, the percentage of investors who assess their investment strategy as high risk, and
the percentage of warrant traders in both groups.7 Table 1 shows that differences of the
above mentioned characteristics in both groups are small and in most cases insignificant.8
Only the mean monthly stock portfolio turnover, the stock portfolio value, and income
are significantly different in both groups. The difference in the income variable is only
marginally significant. Moreover, the income variable is only available for one third of
all investors. Thus, the different turnover values of both groups seem to be the only im-
portant difference. Turnover is negatively related to the stock portfolio value.9 Perhaps,
online traders with higher turnover values who trade more often via internet also check
their e-mails more often and thus answered directly after they received the first e-mail.
The above mentioned results suggest that the two groups can be regarded as two random
subsamples of the whole group of investors who received e-mails.
The investors were (among other questions) asked to give upper and lower bounds of 90 %
confidence intervals to questions concerning stock market forecasts (Deutscher Aktienin-
dex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index, BASF, Deutsche Telekom) for the end of the
7See Glaser (2003) for further details on these characteristics.
8In addition, the whole group of the 215 investors who have answered either in August or September are not significantly
different from the whole group of investors or the group of investors that have not responded to the questionnaire. See
Glaser and Weber (2003) for details.
9See Glaser (2003) .
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year 2001.10
The questions concerning return expectations were as follows:
For the following questions, please give three estimates each. The true answer
to the questions (e.g. in the first question the value of the DAX at the end of
this year) should...
Lower Bound: ...with a high probability (95 %) not
fall short of the lower bound.
Estimate: ...should equally likely
be above respectively below your estimate.
Upper Bound: ... with a high probability (95 %) not
exceed the upper bound.
3 Results
3.1 Return Forecasts
In this subsection, we analyze the return point forecasts until the end of the year 2001
(i.e. over a horizon of 21 and 14 weeks, respectively) of individual investors. The investors
were asked to state their median forecast of the value of two indexes (Deutscher Aktienin-
dex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index) and the prices of two German stocks (BASF,
10There was a fifth question which was a prediction concerning the future price of a stock which was a member of the
Nemax50 index in the year 2001. This question was necessary for calculating the overconfidence score based on stock market
forecasts in Glaser and Weber (2003). All results are similar to the predictions of the Nemax50. However, the time series of
past prices is very short for this stock which makes it, for example, impossible to compare volatility estimates with historical
volatilities. We therefore exclude the answers concerning price and volatility forecasts of this stock in this paper.
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Deutsche Telekom) for the end of the year 2001. In the remainder of this paper, these
four time series are indicated by the subscript i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We first transform these
price or index value forecasts of individual k into returns11:
r(p)ki =
x(p)ki
value
tj
i
− 1, p ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 0.95}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {1, . . . , 215}.
(1)
t1 indicates August, 2nd, t2 September, 20th.
12 x(p) denotes the p fractile of the stock
price or index value forecast, r(p) denotes the p fractile of the respective return forecast
with p ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 0.95}.
In line with the literature (see, for example, Kilka and Weber (2000)), we analyze two
measures of return forecasts. Our first return forecast measure is the median divided by
the value of the respective index or the price of the respective stock. We call this forecast
the median return forecast.
According to Keefer and Bodily (1983), our next measure (henceforth mean return fore-
cast) of time series i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, for individual k, k ∈ {1, . . . , 215} is:
meanki = 0.185 · r(0.05)ki + 0.63 · r(0.50)ki + 0.185 · r(0.95)ki , (2)
where r(p)ki denotes the p fractile of the return distribution with p ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 0.95}.
11Some studies ask directly for returns, others ask for prices. Our method of elicitation was, among others, used by Kilka
and Weber (2000) and Lo¨ffler and Weber (1997).
12The exact time of response is not available. Furthermore, we do not know whether investors answered Thursday night,
or on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Thus, we use the Thursday closing price in both groups to calculate expected returns.
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Keefer and Bodily (1983) show numerically that equation (2) serves as a good three-point
approximation of the mean of a continuous random variable.
Table 2 presents the results of return point forecasts. The first observation is that the
investors in both groups did not answer all questions concerning stock market predictions.
For example, 115 of 129 investors, who answered the questions after the first e-mail,
provided median as well as upper and lower bound of a confidence interval to forecast
DAX returns. Focusing on the DAX forecast, the median of the mean DAX return forecast
is ten times higher after September 11 than before. In the first group (time of response
was August 2, 2001), the median across subjects is 5.14 % over the 21 week horizon until
the end of the year 2001. In the second group the median of the return forecast is 56.52
%. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test (Null hypothesis: the two populations are from the
same distribution) shows that the difference is highly significant (p < 0.0001). Similar
results are obtained when we focus on the median return forecast.
These results do not coincide with findings of Graham and Harvey (2002) who analyze
forecasts of the one year equity premium of CFOs. On September 10, the mean one
year equity premium forecast was 0.05 % whereas the post crisis estimate was −0.70
%. The difference might be explained by the fact that the CFOs possibly answered at
different days and perhaps only very few days after the terror attacks in a situation of
high uncertainty.13 Our subjects made their forecasts after large drops of stock prices
until September 20, which was exactly the day with the lowest blue chip share prices in
Germany in the year 2001 (see the German blue chip index DAX in Figure 1). In addition,
13The exact dates do not appear in the Graham and Harvey (2002) study. Furthermore, the U.S. stock exchanges closed
until September 17 whereas the German stock exchanges remained open.
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the results of Graham and Harvey (2002) are not significant due to the low number of
observations. Shiller (1987) finds results comparable to ours after the stock market crash
of 1987. He sent out questionnaires to individual and institutional investors at the evening
of the day of the crash (October 19, 1987) and the following four days to better understand
the causes of the crash and investor behavior in a situation of suddenly dropping share
prices. One question asked investors whether they knew when a rebound was to occur. A
surprisingly high 29.2 % of the individual investors answered “yes” in this unprecedented
situation. Investors were thus pretty sure to know when the rebound was likely to occur.
Furthermore, many individual investors stated “intuition” or “gut feeling” or just that
they “knew there would be a rebound” as reasons for their conjectures.14 Although we did
not ask similar questions, the above mentioned findings by Shiller (1987) might present
explanations for our findings of very high return forecasts after the terror attacks in our
sample. The investors in our sample, like the investors in the Shiller (1987) sample, also
seem to know when the rebound will occur. Their predictions suggest that they think
the rebound will occur until the end of the year 2001. Unfortunately, we are not able to
analyze whether the respondents of the second group actually bought stocks at the time of
response. Due to an organizational restructuring it was impossible to obtain transaction
data apart from the data set mentioned above.
Moreover, the investors in our sample are not completely wrong in their forecasts. When
we compare the return forecasts with the actually realized returns until the end of the
year 2001, we first observe that investors are optimistic about the future performance
of stock prices in both groups. The actual return is overestimated by approximately 15
14Shiller (1987), pp. 12-13.
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percentage points in the first group and by approximately 20 percentage points in the
second group. However, the return forecast of the second group of about 56 % over the
14 week horizon is only 1.6 times the value of the actual return until the end of the year
which was 35.45 %.
The remaining results of Table 2 show that the results concerning DAX return forecasts
are robust. Similar results are obtained for the other three time series. The mean and
median return forecasts of the investors in our sample are significantly higher in the
second group. The actual returns are overestimated in both groups. The second group of
investors states return forecasts that are approximately twice as high as the true returns.
Furthermore, column six of Table 2 shows that even the difference between the return
forecasts of investors in both groups are about the same as the difference in the actually
realized returns until the end of the year 2001 across the four time series. For example, the
difference of the actual returns of the BASF stock from the respective time of response
until the end of the year 2001 is 40.85 %. The difference of the return forecasts in both
groups is about 43 %.
Why is the expected return for the Nemax50 in the second group about twice as high as
the expected return for the DAX? The return of both indexes from September 10 until
September 20 is similar (about −18 %). Accordingly, the drop in the values of the two
indexes from September 10 until September 20 does not help to explain the high expected
Nemax50 returns. Perhaps the returns of both indexes over the whole year 2001 until
September 20 may serve as an explanation. Whereas the DAX “only” dropped by 40 %
in this period, the Nemax50 almost crashed with a return of about −75 % (see Figure
13
1 and Figure 2). If investors expect mean reversion, these return differences might be an
explanation for the higher expected return for the Nemax50: The lower the returns in the
previous months, the higher individuals’ return forecasts.
3.2 Volatility Forecasts
Table 3 presents estimations of the standard deviation or volatility of returns. The return
volatility estimate of individual k, k ∈ {1, . . . , 215}, for time series i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is
calculated as follows (see Keefer and Bodily (1983)):
stddevki =
√
0.185 · (r(0.05)ki )2 + 0.63 · (r(0.50)ki )2 + 0.185 · (r(0.95)ki )2 − (meanki )2, (3)
with meanki as given in equation (2). r(p)
k
i denotes the p fractile of the return distribution
with p ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 0.95}. Keefer and Bodily (1983) show numerically that equation (3)
serves as a good three-point approximation of the standard deviation of a continuous
random variable.
The main (and perhaps unsurprising) result of Table 3 is summarized as follows. After
September 11, the volatility forecasts are higher. A Mann-Whitney test rejects equality
of volatility estimates for all four time series (all p-values are below 0.0001). These results
are in line with the Graham and Harvey (2002) study. As volatility benchmarks we use
several historical volatilities (volatilities of non-overlapping 21 week returns (column 3 of
Table 3) and 14 week returns (column 4 of Table 3)).15 Historical volatilities are often
15For the Nemax50 and Deutsche Telekom, there is only a very short time series of price data available. Therefore, we
calculate historical volatilities until March 2003.
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used as an objective volatility benchmark or an estimate for the future volatility.16 Prior
to the terror attacks the historical volatility of returns over the respective time horizons
is underestimated in all four cases. This finding is in line with the overconfidence lit-
erature.17 The term “overconfidence” summarizes many different phenomena: investors
overestimate the precision of their knowledge, their probability estimates are often not
well calibrated, they overestimate their ability to do well in the future, they think that
they can control and predict random tasks, and they assess themselves as above average
with regard to skills when compared to others.18 Overconfidence is regarded as “perhaps
the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment” (De Bondt and Thaler (1995),
p. 389). Most behavioral models incorporate judgment biases into theories of financial
markets by assuming that at least some market participants are overconfident in the way
that they overestimate the precision of their knowledge or underestimate the variance of
information signals. As a consequence, their confidence intervals for the value of a risky
asset are too tight when compared to the rational benchmark. This assumption is in line
with a variety of psychological studies that are often referred to as the “calibration” lit-
erature (see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982)). Before September 11, investors
in our data set underestimate the variance of stock prices which is consistent with the
assumptions of overconfidence models. However, after the crisis, the historical standard
deviation of returns is overestimated in two cases (DAX, BASF). In contrast, Graham
and Harvey (2002) find volatility estimates of one-year risk premiums of 6.79 % prior to
the terror attacks and 9.76 % afterwards compared to historical standard deviations of
16See, for example, Graham and Harvey (2002) and Siebenmorgen and Weber (2001).
17See Glaser and Weber (2003) and Glaser, No¨th, and Weber (2004) for a survey of the overconfidence literature.
18See, for example, Barucci (2003), p. 279.
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one-year stock returns of 13.0 % (1980-2000) or 20.1 % (1926-2000) in the U.S.. In the
cases of Nemax50 and Deutsche Telekom the historical volatility is underestimated. Note,
however, the low number of past non-overlapping return observations of Nemax50 and
Deutsche Telekom used in calculating the standard deviation of returns which makes the
historical standard deviation as volatility benchmark questionable in these two cases.
In the case of the DAX, we are able to calculate the implied volatility over the respective
forecast horizon using the German VDAX. The VDAX expresses the fluctuation range
or implied volatility of the DAX index, as expected by the forward market.19 Volatilities
are quoted in annualized percentages. To calculate 21 week and 14 week percentages we
multiply the VDAX values of August 2, 2001 and September 20, 2001 by
√
21/52 and√
14/52, respectively.
The implied volatility of the DAX until the end of the year 2001 is 12.73 % at August
2, 2001 and 22.90 % at September 20, 2001. Thus, the DAX volatility estimates of the
investors in our sample, especially the increase of the volatility estimate after the terror
attacks seem to be reasonable. One interpretation of this result is that investors rationally
expect a higher risk in the economy. In addition, it is reasonable that the DAX volatility
estimate is the lowest volatility estimate in both groups followed by the BASF, Deutsche
Telekom, and Nemax50 volatility estimate. BASF and Deutsche Telekom are members of
the DAX index who contains 30 German blue chip stocks. An index is more diversified
than a single stock that is part of the index. The index therefore has a lower volatility.
Furthermore, BASF is a low risk value stock and Deutsche Telekom is a high risk tele-
com stock which suggests that BASF stock returns should have a lower volatility than
19See the description if the VDAX volatility index at www.deutsche-boerse.com.
16
Deutsche Telekom stock returns. Nemax50, the New Market index in Germany, is a high
risk segment.
Unreported results show that the skewness of the return distribution given by the investors
in our sample is unaffected by September 11. Furthermore, we asked the group of investors
whether they own the stocks of BASF and Deutsche Telekom at the date of response.
Note, that portfolio positions or transaction data are unavailable at the date of response
of the investors. All the results concerning return and volatility forecasts presented in this
paper are similar for investors who own or do not own the respective stock at the time of
response. In addition, we find that investors who give higher return estimates, on average,
also state higher volatility estimates. The investors in our sample, as a group, seem to
understand the risk-return trade off.
3.3 Differences of Opinion
In this subsection, we especially focus on the level of agreement or disagreement among
investors when interpreting publicly known events such as September 11. Does disagree-
ment increase or decrease in a crisis situation? Besides the standard deviation of return
and volatility forecasts across subjects we calculate a measure of differences of opinion.
Such as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), differences of opinion (henceforth dop)
are calculated as the standard deviation of the forecasts divided by the respective absolute
value of the mean forecast. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) analyze whether differ-
ences of opinion are related to the cross section of expected returns. They find that the
higher their measure of differences of opinion (dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts),
the lower future returns of otherwise similar stocks.
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Table 4 presents means of the mean and median return forecasts. Mean and median return
forecast are defined in Subsection 3.1. Table 4 shows that the means of the return forecasts
are similar in magnitude to the medians of the return forecasts presented in Table 2. The
reason why we present the means of return forecasts in Table 4 (instead of the medians
of the mean and median return forecast presented in Table 2) in addition to the standard
deviation and our measure of differences of opinion is the fact that we scale the standard
deviation by the absolute value of the mean forecast to calculate the dop measure.20
Table 4 shows that the standard deviation of forecasts across subjects is higher after
September 11. However, when we scale the standard deviation by the absolute value of
the mean forecast, Table 4 reports that differences of opinions dop concerning return
forecasts are lower after the terror attacks. The differences of the dop measure of DAX
return forecasts before and after the crisis are driven by the mean forecasts that are close
to zero.
Table 5 shows the mean of the volatility forecast. Volatility forecasts are defined in Sub-
section 3.2. The means of the volatility forecasts are similar in magnitude to the medians
as presented in Table 3. The standard deviation of the volatility forecasts are higher af-
ter the terror attacks. However, when we focus on the dop measure, the picture is less
clear. The dop values are similar for both groups. For the DAX and the BASF stock the
dop measure is slightly lower after September 11. In contrast, for the stock of Deutsche
Telekom the dop measure is slightly higher after the terror attacks. For the New Market
index Nemax50, the dop measure is equal in both groups. Thus, differences of opinion
20We use the exact value of the standard deviation rather than the rounded values reported in Table 4 to calculate the
differences of opinion measure.
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with regard to volatility forecasts are largely unaffected by the terror attacks whereas
differences of opinion concerning return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks.
Furthermore, another interesting finding is presented by Table 4 and Table 5. Differences
of opinion are generally higher with regard to return (point) forecasts when compared
to differences of opinion with regard to volatility forecasts. This finding is interesting
as it presents an empirical test of modeling assumptions in the “differences of opinion”
and the “overconfidence” literature.21 In both types of models, investors often receive
noisy signals which are the sum of two random variables: the value of the risky asset
and a random error term. Loosely speaking, “differences of opinion” models assume that
investors disagree about the mean of the error term whereas investors in “overconfidence”
models disagree about the variance of the error term.22 Our results might be interpreted as
an indication that modeling disagreement about mean returns has a better foundation in
documented investor behavior than disagreement about the variance of returns. However,
we note that this argument is speculation and needs further investigation.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyzes stock return and volatility forecasts of individual investors before and
after the terror attacks of September 11. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1. Return forecasts are significantly higher after September 11 and the large drop in
21See Glaser and Weber (2003) for a discussion of these two strands of literature.
22Note, however, that underestimation of the variance of signals also creates heterogeneity of conditional means (differing
posterior beliefs) that are driven by information (signal realizations), not by differing opinions concerning the mean of the
prior (such as, for example, in Varian (1989)).
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share prices after the terror attacks when compared to the return forecasts before
the attacks.
2. After the terror attacks volatility estimates are in two out of four cases higher than the
historical volatility of returns whereas before the terror attacks historical volatilities
are always underestimated. Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in
the way that they underestimate the variance of stock returns.
3. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks
whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts are mainly unaffected.
The higher volatility estimates of investors after September 11 might be a result of a ra-
tional anticipation of a higher uncertainty in the economy. However, a further explanation
might be an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (see Tversky and Kahneman (1982)). A
higher volatility might, at least in part, arise as investors first predict the value of an
index or the price of a stock in the future. If they then build their confidence intervals
by putting an interval with constant range around their point (or median) estimate, they
will predict higher volatilities when stocks or indexes have lower nominal values as was
the case after September 11.
Other reasons for deviations of forecasts in the two groups might be the different time
horizons of the forecasts (21 versus 14 weeks) as both groups were asked to state end of
the year prices. However, in our view, it is unlikely that the different time horizons will
be a major driving force of our results. On the contrary, one would expect that, over a
shorter horizon, return and volatility forecasts should, anything else equal, be lower for
the second group. However, this is not the case. The driving forces of our results are the
20
September 11 tragedy and the drop of share prices in the days after the terror attacks.
One finding of this study is the high expected return until the end of the year 2001 of the
second group of respondents. And, very striking, investors were not completely wrong:
There was a strong rebound until the end of the year 2001. Perhaps, investors think that
there will be a rebound - and that is the reason, why the rebound actually occurs.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Two Groups of Respondents
This table presents descriptive statistics of various characteristics (age, stock market investment experience in
years, information in hours per week, number of transactions in all security categories, number of stock transac-
tions, mean monthly stock portfolio turnover, stock portfolio value in EUR, income in EUR) of the two groups
of respondents as well as the p-value of a Mann-Whitney test (Null hypothesis is that the two populations are
from the same distribution). Furthermore, the table shows the percentage of men and women, the percentage of
investors who assess their investment strategy as high risk, and the percentage of warrant traders in both groups.
p-value
First group Second group (Mann-Whitney)
Respondents 129 86
Age Median 38 38 0.5603
Mean 39.65 40.65
Standard deviation 9.34 10.60
Observations 115 68
Investment Median 7.5 7.5 0.6086
experience Mean 5.39 5.55
(in years) Standard deviation 3.14 2.90
Observations 95 64
Information Median 4 5 0.8573
(in hours Mean 5.64 6.62
per week) Standard deviation 4.81 8.38
Observations 129 85
Number of Median 105 107.5 0.8535
transactions Mean 166.22 141.09
(all security Standard deviation 225.52 135.59
categories) Observations 129 86
(Jan 1997 - Apr 2001)
Number of Median 55 49.5 0.9856
stock transactions Mean 89.38 98.34
(Jan 1997 - Apr 2001) Standard deviation 109.53 124.09
Observations 125 80
Mean monthly Median 0.36 0.28 0.0397**
stock portfolio Mean 1.30 1.07
turnover Standard deviation 4.21 3.97
Observations 122 77
Mean monthly stock Median 13,139.87 20,897.84 0.0082***
portfolio value Mean 34,601.65 41,053.47
(in EUR) Standard deviation 123,173.30 67,075.18
Observations 125 77
Income Median 38,346.89 38,346.89 0.0946*
(in EUR) Mean 48,012.14 59,559.38
Standard deviation 25,805.54 30,779.31
Observations 42 30
Gender men 94.57% 94.19%
women 5.43% 5.81%
High risk Yes 12.40% 8.14%
investment strategy No 87.60% 91.86%
Warrant trader Yes 44.19% 44.19%
No 55.81% 55.81%
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Table 2: Return Forecasts
This table presents medians of the mean and the median return forecast as well as the difference between the
return forecasts of the two groups of respondents. Median and mean return forecast are defined in Subsection 3.1.
In addition, the table shows the respective actually realized returns from the date of response until the end of the
year 2001. The last column contains p-values of a two-sided Mann-Whitney test (Wilcoxon ranksum test). Null
hypothesis is that the two populations are from the same distribution (return forecasts are equal in both groups).
First group Second group Difference p-value
August 2, 2001 September 20, 2001 of returns (Mann-Whitney)
(1) (2) (2)−(1)
DAX Mean forecast Median across subjects 5.14 % 56.52 % 51.38 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 115 75
Median forecast Median across subjects 3.86 % 57.49 % 53.63 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 117 75
Actual return until -10.68 % 35.45 % 46.13 %
the end of 2001
Nemax50 Mean forecast Median across subjects 23.19 % 95.30 % 72.11 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 111 74
Median forecast Median across subjects 18.92 % 100.24 % 81.32 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 113 74
Actual return until -8.82 % 53.53 % 62.35 %
the end of 2001
BASF Mean forecast Median across subjects 7.39 % 51.07 % 43.68 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 99 66
Median forecast Median across subjects 9.17 % 51.66 % 42.49 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 103 66
Actual return until -8.62 % 32.23 % 40.85 %
the end of 2001
Deutsche Mean forecast Median across subjects 10.07 % 58.46 % 48.39 % < 0.0001
Telekom No. Observations 108 73
Median forecast Median across subjects 11.99 % 56.15 % 44.16 % < 0.0001
No. Observations 112 73
Actual return until -19.54 % 21.17 % 40.71 %
the end of 2001
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Table 3: Volatility Forecasts
This table presents median volatility forecasts of the two groups of respondents for two German stock market
indexes and two German blue chip stocks. Volatility forecasts are calculated as described in Subsection 3.2. In
addition, the table shows historical volatilities of (non-overlapping) 21 week returns (column 3) and 14 week
returns (column 4), respectively. For the Nemax50 and Deutsche Telekom, there is only a very short time series of
price data available. Therefore, we calculate historical volatilities until March 2003. For the DAX, the table reports
the implied volatility of the respective response date as well. These implied volatilities were calculated using the
VDAX. The VDAX expresses the fluctuation range or implied volatility of the DAX index, as expected by the
forward market. See Subsection 3.2 for details. Column 5 contains p-values of a two-sided Mann-Whitney test
(Wilcoxon ranksum test). Null hypothesis is that the two populations are from the same distribution (volatility
forecasts are equal in both groups).
First group Second group p-value
August 2, 2001 September 20, 2001 (Mann-Whitney)
DAX Median across subjects 6.53 % 12.39 % < 0.0001
Number of Observations 115 75
Historical standard 14.65 % 12.31 %
deviation (January 1988-time of response)
Implied volatility 12.73 % 22.90 %
Nemax50 Median across subjects 18.49 % 33.74 % < 0.0001
Number of Observations 111 74
Historical standard 39.94 % 41.48 %
deviation (January 1998 - March 2003)
BASF Median across subjects 6.97 % 14.43 % < 0.0001
Number of Observations 99 65
Historical standard 15.65 % 11.80 %
deviation (January 1988 - time of response)
Deutsche Median across subjects 13.00 % 19.23 % < 0.0001
Telekom Number of Observations 108 73
Historical standard 35.32 % 27.84 %
deviation (November 1996 - March 2003)
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Table 4: Return Forecasts: Differences of Opinion
This table presents means of the mean and median return forecast. Mean and median return forecast are defined
as in Subsection 3.1. Furthermore, the table shows standard deviation of return forecasts as well as the differences
of opinion. Differences of opinion (dop) are calculated as the standard deviation of the return forecasts divided
by the respective absolute value of the mean return forecast.
First group Second group
August 2, 2001 September 20, 2001
DAX Mean forecast Mean -0.0136 0.4360
Standard deviation 0.18 0.29
Differences of opinion dop 12.88 0.66
Median forecast Mean -0.0087 0.4490
Standard deviation 0.18 0.29
Differences of opinion dop 20.19 0.65
Nemax50 Mean forecast Mean 0.2972 0.9858
Standard deviation 0.56 0.76
Differences of opinion dop 1.89 0.77
Median forecast Mean 0.2878 0.9256
Standard deviation 0.48 0.71
Differences of opinion dop 1.68 0.77
BASF Mean forecast Mean 0.0311 0.4212
Standard deviation 0.17 0.32
Differences of opinion dop 5.58 0.75
Median forecast Mean 0.0340 0.4300
Standard deviation 0.18 0.32
Differences of opinion dop 5.27 0.74
Deutsche Telekom Mean forecast Mean 0.0862 0.5123
Standard deviation 0.30 0.36
Differences of opinion dop 3.46 0.71
Median forecast Mean 0.0931 0.5134
Standard deviation 0.30 0.37
Differences of opinion dop 3.21 0.71
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Table 5: Volatility Forecasts: Differences of Opinion
This table presents the mean of the volatility forecast. Volatility forecasts are defined as in Subsection 3.2.
Furthermore, the table shows standard deviation of volatility forecasts as well as the differences of opinion.
Differences of opinion (dop) are calculated as the standard deviation of the volatility forecasts divided by the
respective absolute value of the mean volatility forecast.
First group Second group
August 2, 2001 September 20, 2001
DAX Mean 0.0743 0.1298
Standard deviation 0.04 0.07
Differences of opinion dop 0.57 0.52
Nemax50 Mean 0.2236 0.4014
Standard deviation 0.16 0.28
Differences of opinion dop 0.70 0.70
BASF Mean 0.0911 0.1469
Standard deviation 0.05 0.08
Differences of opinion dop 0.56 0.51
Deutsche Telekom Mean 0.1423 0.2283
Standard deviation 0.07 0.14
Differences of opinion dop 0.51 0.60
30
Figure 1: Chart of the DAX in the Year 2001
This figure presents the chart of the DAX in the year 2001. The first vertical line in the chart indicates the
date of response of the first group (August 2, 2001), the second vertical line shows the date of response
of the second group (September 20, 2001).
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Figure 2: Chart of the Nemax50 in the Year 2001
This figure presents the chart of the Nemax50 in the year 2001. The first vertical line in the chart indicates
the date of response of the first group (August 2, 2001), the second vertical line shows the date of response
of the second group (September 20, 2001).
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Figure 3: Chart of BASF in the Year 2001
This figure presents the chart of BASF in the year 2001. The first vertical line in the chart indicates the
date of response of the first group (August 2, 2001), the second vertical line shows the date of response
of the second group (September 20, 2001).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1/1
/01
1/1
5/0
1
1/2
9/0
1
2/1
2/0
1
2/2
6/0
1
3/1
2/0
1
3/2
6/0
1
4/9
/01
4/2
3/0
1
5/7
/01
5/2
1/0
1
6/4
/01
6/1
8/0
1
7/2
/01
7/1
6/0
1
7/3
0/0
1
8/1
3/0
1
8/2
7/0
1
9/1
0/0
1
9/2
4/0
1
10
/8/
01
10
/22
/01
11
/5/
01
11
/19
/01
12
/3/
01
12
/17
/01
12
/31
/01
33
Figure 4: Chart of Deutsche Telekom in the Year 2001
This figure presents the chart of Deutsche Telekom in the year 2001. The first vertical line in the chart
indicates the date of response of the first group (August 2, 2001), the second vertical line shows the date
of response of the second group (September 20, 2001).
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